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Abstract
Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a
principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the
(fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance
or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporat-
ing these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards
an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage.
We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D in-
vestment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic
incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the finan-
cial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application
of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.
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1 Introduction.
This note addresses the interaction of pricing and insurance coverage in the phar-
maceutical market. In particular, we assess the normative allocation of R&D costs
across the different markets served by a pharmaceutical corporation under the pres-
ence of insurance. Our focus is on the implications of explicit recognition of health
insurance coverage to the optimal Ramsey prices to finance pharmaceutical R&D.
We show that higher insurance coverage calls for higher prices not only because
of lower demand elasticity but also due to a larger moral hazard effect in the con-
sumption of pharmaceutical products.
R&D costs associated with new pharmaceutical products have increased sub-
stantially in the past three decades. DiMasi et al. (2003) estimate the total R&D
cost per new drug in 2001 at $802 million.1 The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug
Development (2003), increases the estimate further to $897 million in 2003.2
The sharp increase in R&D expenses combines, in the case of the pharmaceu-
tical industry, with the traditional differences of drug prices across countries due
to a number of factors. Among them, we find different regulatory regimes and in-
surance systems, together with governments that often are monopsonistic buyers
of drugs. The foundations of these price differences are the object of intense de-
bate as opposed to a policy of uniform prices supported by the presence of parallel
imports or the use of the so-called reference pricing system. Danzon and Towse
(2003) argue that these elements lie at the heart of the objective to set a single price
within the European Union. Danzon (no date) argues against these practices as
they are harmful to R&D efforts. Her argument relies on two facts. On the one
hand, R&D is a fixed cost once the new product is developed, and on the other
hand, “(...) as R&D costs cannot be rationally allocated as a direct cost of serving
a specific country or consumer group, there is a strong incentive for each country
to free-ride, leaving others to pay for the joint R&D costs.”
1See Frank (2003) for an assessment on how to interpret this estimation.
2One should read these estimates bearing in mind that allocating the R&D cost of particular drug
is not an easy task. Such costs span over a long period of time (see Toole, 2005), and also incorporate
somehow the costs of failed attempts before succeeding with a new molecule.
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To support price differences across countries the use of Ramsey prices has been
proposed. Ramsey (discriminatory) prices result from a welfare maximizing prob-
lem where firms obtain “normal” profit returns, allowing for the recovery of the
fixed cost. The Ramsey rule determines prices above marginal cost. The amount
by which price exceeds marginal cost is greater for goods with less elastic demand.
This is known as the inverse elasticity rule.
This is a controversial issue. Raghavan (2001) contrasts the differential pric-
ing for medicines as promoted by the WHO and the WTO, with the “exorbitant
profits of the transnational pharmaceutical industry.” Also, he argues that “to view
essential drugs and medicines and their pricing in terms of high and low elastic
demands of the consumer is not a preposition that can be sustained (...) in public
health contexts.” In the same vein Love (2001) claims that the “big problem with
Ramsey pricing is that everyone loves to push the price discrimination part, which
is pricing according to what people are willing to pay, but there is considerably
less enthusiasm for the other part, which is the budget constraint. And, without the
government regulation of the budget constraint, you just have monopoly pricing,
which is not in fact efficient, in most cases, not to mention the ethical issues, or the
rather messy empirical realities of industry pricing practices.”
In contrast, Scherer (2001) assesses the evidence on the link between profits
and R&D effort in the US pharmaceutical industry. He concludes that “(...) as
profit opportunities expand, firms compete to exploit them by increasing invest-
ments, primarily in R&D, until the increases in costs dissipates most, if not all,
supranormal profit returns.” Also Danzon and Towse (2003) argue in favor of Ram-
sey prices as ”(...) in the long run with unrestricted entry and exit of firms offering
competing but differentiated products, dynamic competition will reduce expected
profits to normal levels at the margin.” Besides, Ramsey pricing assumes that the
social value of an extra dollar of consumption of an individual is the same across
markets. In western economies this may not be implausible, but when different
markets are located in developed and developing countries, such an assumption is
hard to maintain.
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To overcome this difficulty, Diamond (1975) proposed the so-called many-
person Ramsey rule as a generalization of the Ramsey pricing to allow for dis-
tributional concerns. Jack and Lanjouw (2003) apply this generalized rule to the
cost-sharing of pharmaceutical innovation in an international context where world
income distribution is used to adjust international pharmaceutical prices. They con-
clude that (i) with those adjustments, poor countries should not necessarily share
any of the costs of R&D, and (ii) the pricing structure is not related to that which
would be chosen by a monopolist in a simple (proportional) way. The argument
for sustaining price differentials is reinforced by the simulation study of Dumon-
liu (2001), where access to pharmaceuticals would be seriously impeded under a
global uniform price.
We focus on the issue of how to impute the overall R&D costs in the pharma-
ceutical industry across countries in the presence of insurance regimes that may
differ across countries. We depart from Danzon and Towse (2003) who propose to
use the principle of Ramsey pricing to define the price differentials across markets
to cover the (fixed) R&D costs. Their main concern is to have richer countries
paying enough to allow for the recovery of R&D costs associated with new drugs,
while keeping prices low in developing countries, to ensure wide access to pharma-
ceuticals. Direct application of Ramsey pricing principles lead to this sort of dif-
ferential pricing rules as long as consumers in low-income countries have a more
price-elastic demand. Danzon and Towse (2003) comment on the role of insurance
in making demand faced by pharmaceuticals to be more or less price sensitive.
However, they do not investigate further the changes in the Ramsey pricing rule
that result from differences between the price paid by consumers (net of insurance)
and the value received by the firm.
Our approach attempts to make sense of the price differences across countries.
To that end, we characterize the Ramsey prices maximizing aggregate welfare. The
equilibrium pricing rule obtained differs from the standard Ramsey pricing rule in
the sense that for equal demand elasticities, and given distortion cost of funds,
a country with a higher coverage rate will have a higher price as well. This is
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due to the well-known ex-post moral hazard problem of health insurance. Since
insurance implies a lower price at the moment of consumption, consumers tend
to overspend, in the sense of marginal benefit being smaller than social marginal
cost at the equilibrium. This effect is larger the higher the coverage rate, which
motivates a higher price to partially correct it. Also, we examine some comparative
statics effects. Among them, we find that governments do not have incentives to
strategically use insurance copayment rates in the determination of prices.
To see intuitively why the level of insurance makes a difference, consider two
markets (countries) with the same (constant) price elasticity of demand but differ-
ent insurance levels. Assume that in one country insurance copayments are 50%
while in the other copayment is only 10%. Efficient pricing a` la Ramsey deter-
mines a higher price in the country where quantity is less distorted. This means
that the country with the higher copayment should pay most of the R&D costs,
since little distortion in consumption seems to result. This brings to our context
an effect that extends Besley (1988), who finds that the design of optimal (second-
best) insurance policies is driven by the trade-off between the economic losses from
moral hazard and the gains from risk sharing.
This, some would say, just acknowledges that price elasticity of demand does
still matter. However, this simple intuition fails to take into account an additional
aspect. Different copayment rates yield different levels of the usual moral hazard
problem of excessive consumption (as the price faced by consumers at the mo-
ment of consumption is zero). Therefore, a benevolent planner, as implied by the
Ramsey optimal pricing problem, will actually want to take this into account.
The social planner may want to increase more the price in the market with
higher copayment rate to counteract on the moral hazard effect. In addition, since
there is some extra consumption under more insurance, the financing constraint is
less binding than otherwise, allowing for lower prices.
The price setting problem will make a balance between the distortions needed
to allow for recovery of the fixed cost and the compensation of the moral hazard
effect. Together with the moral hazard problem generated by insurance, the way
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countries define copayments has to take into account the equity and access issues
underlying the design of differential prices.
In terms of the discussion of high prices in rich countries/low prices in poor
countries, as long as insurance coverage is more generous in richer countries, our
point reinforces the efficiency argument for international pricing differentials. Our
contribution in this literature is to provide some building blocks towards an eco-
nomic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. Of course,
what arrangement may actually be implemented influences the incentives of firms
to perform R&D.
The problem of sharing the R&D fixed cost over several countries has a clear
analogy with third-degree price discrimination. In this line, think of the welfare
properties of third-degree price discrimination pioneered by Schmalensee (1981).
He proved that under monopoly, necessary conditions for Ramsey prices to be wel-
fare improving are that total sales increase over all markets. This result generated
a stream of contributions addressing its generality. Galera and Zaratiegui (2006)
show that under asymmetric oligopoly when third-degree price discrimination fa-
vors the lower cost firm, the welfare loss may be offset by the cost savings. Felder
(2006) proposes to add to the distortion from the Ramsey prices another distortion
originated from a subsidy to consumers as a way to offset the welfare reducing
effect of price discrimination. Felder (2004) shows the advantages of a two-part
tariff, using the standard result that price (of insurance coverage) will be equal to
marginal cost, and the lump-sum payment divides surplus between the third-party
payer and the firm. This lump-sum payment takes into account differences in the
coinsurance rates across countries. Finally, Adachi (2002, 2005) also shows that
Schmalensee’s result does not hold either in the presence of consumer externalities.
However, our concern does not go into these considerations. We are interested
in making sense of the differences in prices across countries instead. Our interest
lies in understanding how different insurance coverage policies change the optimal
Ramsey prices. We also address the question of whether such coverage policies
will be used strategically by third-party payers in order to shift financial burden to
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others.
The paper is organized in the following way: next section presents the basic
model. Section 3 discusses how Ramsey prices are distorted by the presence of
coinsurance schemes (copayment and reference prices). Section 4 explores com-
parative statics and Section 5 provides further extensions. A section with conclu-
sions closes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a set I of countries where a pharmaceutical company sells a (patented)
drug. We assume, for simplicity, that countries are identical in size and that indi-
viduals within each country are also identical and summarized by a representative
consumer. Accordingly, there is no room for introducing equity concerns. On this
issue the reader is referred to Jack and Lanjouw (2003). Countries differ in their
health insurance arrangements covering pharmaceutical consumption.
Health care insurance reimbursement schemes are typically based either on a
direct cost-sharing rule or on a reference price. Let pi be the price of the drug in
country i. A coverage rate si ∈ [0, 1] in country i means that the insurer bears a
proportion sipi of the cost of the drug,3
An alternative insurance arrangement used in several countries is a reference
price system. Reference price p̂i in country i is defined as the price level above
which the patient is fully responsible for the payment. For prices below the refer-
ence price, the insurer bears the cost of the drug provided.
In general, the price paid by the patient in country i, pci , is given by
pci = pi − pi(pi), with pi(pi) = (1− δ)pˆi + δsipi (1)
where pi is the cost-sharing in case of need of medical care. For δ = 1 we obtain
the coinsurance setting while for δ = 0 the reference pricing scheme arises. Values
of δ ∈ (0, 1) define mixed systems.
3We follow here the definition in Mossialos et al. (2007, p. 41) and the patient pays the remaining
amount (1− si)pi.
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Let Di(pci ) be the demand for the relevant drug in country i ∈ I . The pharma-
ceutical company has to recover R&D costs, given by F , and has production costs
given by a constant marginal cost c.
We assume the existence of a supra-national entity that will define prices as to
maximize social welfare over a set I of countries,4 under the constraint of recoup-
ing the R&D cost. All countries are valued equally. In a broader sense, discussion
of international allocation of R&D costs of pharmaceutical products necessarily
implies some sort of coordination mechanism across countries. We model the out-
come of this coordination mechanism (which can be rounds of multilateral talks,
for example) as being similar to that of a supra-national entity.5
From the point of view of the supra-national entity, the problem of determi-
nation of optimal prices, while recovering the cost of research and development
expenditures, takes into account consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus, and the
payments made for drug reimbursement. This last element, introduces a public
funds distortion cost in the case of a public insurer, or the insurance loading in the
case of private insurance companies. We denote such distortion cost of funds by
η > 0. Thus, the social welfare function can be written as
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)piDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)D(pci )
)
− F (2)
We discuss below the results obtained for the co-insurance regime. the same qual-
itative implications are obtained under reference pricing (see the appendix).
3 Optimal Ramsey prices when insurance differs across
countries.
The consumer’s price at the moment of consumption net of any insurance the con-
sumer may have is given by
pci = pi(1− si), (3)
4From a European perspective, this would correspond to the European Commission, Enterprise
and Industry DG.
5The implications of distortions arising from this coordination mechanism are left for future re-
search.
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where si is the coverage rate and pi the price received by the pharmaceutical com-
pany, as described above (δ = 1).
The problem of determination of optimal prices, while recovering the cost of
research and development expenditures, is given by
max
{pi}
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)sipiDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)Di(pci )
)
− F
(4)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0.
The first-order conditions of this problem are:
∂L
∂pi
= −Di(pci )(1 + siη)− si(1− si)(1 + η)pi
∂Di
∂pci
+
+ (1 + λ)
[
Di(pci ) + (pi − ci)(1− si)
∂Di
∂pci
]
= 0, i ∈ I (5)
∂L
∂λ
=
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0 (6)
Rearranging the first-order conditions, we can write, using (3)
pi − ci
pi
=
λ
1 + λ
1
εi
+
si
1 + λ
κi, κi ≡ 1− η
(
1− εi
εi
)
(7)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the zero-profit constraint, and
εi = −∂D/∂p× p/D denotes demand elasticity.
The distortion cost η has an upper bound smaller than one. Most estimates put
this value in a range around 0.2.6 Also, the presence of insurance is likely to make
demand inelastic with values in coverage contexts around 0.2 (Newhouse, 1993;
Ringel et al, 2005). For those values, κi takes positive values. Thus, heretofore,
we will assume 1 > κi > 0. Note that we cannot make a direct comparison with
the equilibrium values under no insurance (si = 0), as λ is an endogenous variable
as well.
The equilibrium pricing rule obtained differs from the standard Ramsey pricing
rule in the last term: for equal demand elasticities, Lagrange multiplier, and given
6For more details, see, inter alia, Allgood and Snow (2006) and Fullerton (1991).
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distortion cost of funds, a country with a higher coverage rate will have a higher
price as well. This is due to the well-known ex-post moral hazard problem of health
insurance. Since insurance implies a lower price at the moment of consumption,
consumers tend to overspend, in the sense of marginal benefit being smaller than
social marginal cost at the equilibrium. This effect is larger the higher the coverage
rate, which motivates a higher pi as to partially correct it.
This additional motive for price differentials may, or may not, reinforce price
dispersion across countries. Whenever besides lower price elasticity of demand,
richer countries also have a higher insurance coverage, then they should face higher
prices than low-income countries for efficiency reasons alone.
This result also implies that assessment of international price dispersion cannot
be made on the basis of marginal cost and price elasticity of demand differences.
One must also look at coverage rate variations.
It is also noteworthy that Ramsey pricing is still not supportive of a policy of
uniform prices across countries. It may accidentally occur that εi and si are such
that price-cost margins are equal across countries, but a small perturbation in the
fixed cost F would destroy such uniform prices. In other words, from (7) and given
(ci, cj), there may exist (si, sj ; εi, εj) such that (pi − ci)/pi = (pj − cj)/pj .
The existence of insurance has actually another indirect effect. Holding prices
constant, increasing the coverage rate means more revenues to the company as
consumption expands. This helps to finance the fixed costs. Therefore, λ also
varies, in equilibrium, with exogenous shifts in the coverage rate.
The comparison of prices for distinct levels of the coverage rate cannot be fully
assessed from the mere statement of first-order conditions. A full comparative
statics exercise must be performed, which we report below for the two-country
case.
4 Comparative statics in a two-country market
We are now interested in understanding how different coverage rates translate into
price differences in an agreement to share R&D costs according to the Ramsey
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principles. To this purpose, the analysis below discusses how do optimal prices
change when a country (say, country 1) increases its coverage level (decreases the
co-insurance rate faced by consumers).
A full assessment of this question calls for a model where prices are set cen-
trally and countries can determine their insurance coverage rates either in a simul-
taneous or sequential way. Such model would go beyond the scope of this note.
Instead we propose to look at the local effects around the equilibrium prices.
Assume, for ease of computation, but without loss of generality) that we have
two countries, I = {1, 2}. Total differentiation of first-order conditions yields, for
a change in s1,
∂2L
∂p21
dp1 +
∂2L
∂p1∂λ
dλ+
∂2L
∂p1∂s1
ds1 = 0, (8)
∂2L
∂p22
dp2 +
∂2L
∂p2∂λ
dλ = 0, (9)
∂2L
∂λ∂p1
dp1 +
∂2L
∂λ∂p2
dp2 = 0, (10)
where L denotes the Lagrangian function of the optimization problem.
We solve this system for dpi/ds1 and dλ/ds1. The comparative statics exercise
establishes:7
dp1
ds1
≶ 0, dp2
ds1
< 0,
dλ
ds1
< 0. (11)
These results imply the following. An increase in the coverage rate in country 1
increases overall consumption and allows to finance more easily the R&D costs
(the amount F ). This alleviates the constraint faced (dλ/ds1 < 0), which in itself
would allow for a reduction of prices in both countries. In country 2 there are no
further effects and an increase in the coverage rate in country 1 should decrease
the optimal Ramsey price in country 2 (dp2/ds1 < 0). On country 1, however,
an increase in the coverage rate also increases the moral hazard issue (the subsidy
must also be paid, and at the margin consumption occurs where marginal benefit
is already below marginal costs). To control for this, the price in country 1 should
7On top of the usual regularity conditions stated previously, we also make use of the assumption
of a concave or not too convex demand function to ensure ∂2L/∂p1∂s1 > 0.
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increase. Thus, the effect of raising coverage in a country can be a decrease or an
increase of its price in the optimal Ramsey pricing system.
However, we are able to obtain some clear cut comparative statics results re-
garding the impact on the relative contributions of the countries to the financing
the fixed cost when country 1 increases its coverage rate. Thus, assume country 1
increases si and compute the impact on country 2’s contribution in financing the
R&D cost. This is given by,
∂p2
∂s1
(
D2 + (p2 − c2)(1− s2)∂D2
∂p2
)
=
∂p2
∂s1
D2
(
1− ε2 (p2 − c2)
p2
)
=
∂p2
∂s1
D2
1− ε2 − s2 − κ2
1 + λ
< 0
where we have made use of (7) and (11).
Therefore, in our two-country world, if a country increases its coverage level si,
it will induce a decrease in country j’s contribution to the fixed R&D cost. Accord-
ingly, as the full R&D outlays have to be funded, necessarily in our two-country
world, country i must increase its contribution.
Optimal prices do depend on coverage policies (reimbursement level) adopted
by each and very country. As one can see from comparative statics results, we
cannot infer that a higher level of coverage necessarily leads to a higher (or lower)
price in that country. And, as discussed above, a higher coverage policy means
that a country bears a higher burden in financing R&D investment. From this
observation, one might be tempted to conjecture that countries may try to play
against the Ramsey price system, decreasing coverage to reduce their share of the
burden. Such conjecture is, however, incorrect.
5 Further extensions
5.1 Country-specific coverage decisions
Another implication of the analysis is related to the interaction between coverage
decisions at the country level and prices determined, on international agreement,
according to the Ramsey principles outlined. Coverage decisions at the country
level are determined by the value of pharmaceutical consumption (as specified for
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each country i in the social welfare measure defined in (2)) and by the valuation
attached to insurance coverage provided to people. As long as the later are country-
specific (that is, there are no cross-country externalities), then no country has an
incentive to strategically use the coverage policies to influence the price outcome.
Determination of how the R&D cost is divided across countries according to a
set of prices (given coverage policies) and each country’s decision on the level of
insurance coverage for pharmaceutical products are independent problems. This is
a consequence of prices resulting from the solution to an optimization problem.8
5.2 Welfare
It is relevant to note that in our setup the coverage rate s1 is overall welfare de-
creasing (dL/ds1 < 0), as
∂L
∂s1
= p21
∂D1
∂pc1
λ
ε1
< 0 (12)
where we have made use of (7).
This is not surprising as the coverage rate plays only the role of a price subsidy
here. This is so because we have not modeled the costs of bearing risk, and the
welfare gains of insurance, which would work in the opposite direction in what
respects the total effect.
With explicit consideration of the insurance arrangements, price equal to marginal
cost is not optimal even for λ = 0. That is, even if revenues under normal market
conditions are sufficient to cover the R&D costs, it is optimal to have price above
marginal cost.
5.3 Arbitrage across countries
We finally discuss the role of arbitrage across countries. The existence of arbitrage
means one additional constraint in the choice problem of the Government, which
8It results from a straightforward application of two-stage games solving techniques- The game
we consider has first countries choosing the level of coverage and, in a second stage, the prices are
determined according the Ramsey principles to share the R&D burden. The key elements for the
result are the country-specific valuations of insurance coverage as the cross-effects of coverage on
prices are of second-order, by application of the envelope theorem.
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does not improve with respect to its absence. An immediate implication of perfect
arbitrage between countries is that prices will be equal in both countries, which
in turn makes the price to the consumer to be fully determined by the financial
constraint.
5.4 The moral hazard case for cost-sharing
Another issue that can be addressed in our framework is the desirability of having
a cost-sharing driven by the need to finance the R&D costs, against the alternative
of consumers paying the full price.
Lets us consider the general price defined in (1)and the associated welfare func-
tion is given by (2). The impact of an exogenous change in the cost-sharing is
dW
dp¯i
= (1+η)p¯i
∂Di
∂pci
+(pi−ci)∂Di
∂pci
(
∂pi
∂p¯i
− 1
)
+(pj−cj)∂Dj
∂pcj
∂pj
∂p¯i
, j 6= i (13)
Evaluated at p¯i = 0, and given that from the comparative statics results, ∂pi/∂p¯i <
1, ∂pj/∂p¯i < 0, one obtains dW/p¯i > 0. Therefore, for positive R&D costs to
be financed, under the assumption of unitary social cost of funds, it is welfare
improving to have a positive cost-sharing.
We find this result remarkable because, even without considering the welfare
effects of insurance, it turns out that a positive contribution by consumers at the
point of consumption to finance a fixed R&D cost is welfare enhancing.
6 Final remarks
We have addressed here the problem of sharing pharmaceutical R&D costs across
countries. The standard Ramsey pricing model has to be adjusted for the existence
of insurance coverage policies. Although previous works recognized the role of
the insurance effects (Danzon and Towse, 2003, Felder, 2004, 2006), they did not
explore fully its implications.
From our model, for equal demand structure, a higher coverage leads to a
higher price in the optimal Ramsey pricing system. Moreover, in general, we
cannot relate price dispersion across countries to differences in price elasticity of
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demand. This holds true both in a co-insurance regime and in a reference pricing
system for pharmaceutical cost-sharing policy by the third-party payer.
The impact of an increase in coverage in one country has an ambiguous effect
upon the optimal price in that country: the impact on the moral hazard effect calls
for a price increase; on the other hand, it also increases consumption, making it
easier to finance the R&D fixed cost and allowing for lower prices.
Our analysis is relevant for two different discussions taking place at interna-
tional fora. The first one is how to share the cost of bringing new drugs to the
market between developed and developing countries (Danzon and Towse, 2003).
To the standard arguments, we add that countries with a higher level of health in-
surance protection, be it from private or public origin, should bear higher prices.
As developed countries have, in general, more extensive and sophisticated health
insurance mechanisms, we should see in them higher prices, based in economic
efficiency arguments.
The second discussion is related to the work at the European Commission level
on pricing and reimbursement for new pharmaceutical products. Previous discus-
sions have hinted at a common ex-factory price over Europe, which is not supported
by our model (nor by the simple Ramsey rule). The current public face of such con-
cerns is the Pharmaceutical Forum set by the European Commission in June 2005,
and its Working Group on Pricing.9
We show that differences in health insurance coverage levels do matter for the
discussion. This may add, or compensate for, the usual implication of Ramsey pric-
ing of charging higher prices to low demand price elasticity groups (as distortions
in quantities consumed by those groups are smaller).
One may fear that any international agreement, either at the European Union
level or broader, may be prone to strategic behavior, namely through manipulation
of insurance coverage levels as they influence the “optimal prices” for each country.
However, due to the moral hazard aspect of health insurance, our model suggests
this risk is minimal.
9The Pharmaceutical Forum is considered by the European Commission as a “high level political
platform” to discuss “competitiveness and related public health issues”.
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The determination of the optimal coverage policy has not been addressed here
in an explicit way. We can, nonetheless, establish that such problem does not
introduce strategic behavior by Governments as long as country-specific valuations
of insurance coverage prevail. Returning to the argument of Danzon (no date),
our analysis suggests that although efforts to shift burden to other countries may
exist, coinsurance policies will not be used for such purpose (whenever benefits
are country specific). Therefore, discussion of the price system that distributes the
R&D cost across markets can be done independently of how the coinsurance levels
are determined in each country.
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Appendix: Reference prices
A reference price p̂i as defined above means that pci = pi−p̂i. The welfare measure
of the supra-national authority is given by the lagrangian function of the welfare
maximization problem, that is,
max
{pi}
W =
∑
i∈I
(∫ ∞
pci
Di(p)dp− (1 + η)p̂iDi(pci ) + (pi − ci)Di(pci )
)
− F
(14)
s.t.
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0
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The corresponding first-order conditions for welfare maximization are
∂L
∂pi
= −Di(pci )− (1 + η)pˆi
∂Di
∂pci
+
+ (1 + λ)
[
Di(pci ) + (pi − ci)
∂Di
∂pci
]
= 0, i ∈ I (15)
∂L
∂λ
=
∑
i∈I
(pi − ci)Di(pci )− F = 0 (16)
From these expressions, we can easily obtain the comparative statics of an increase
in pˆ1 in a two-country world. Similar to what happens with the coverage arrange-
ment,
dp1
dp̂1
≶ 0; dp2
dp̂1
< 0;
dλ
dp̂1
< 0 (17)
Therefore, the qualitative effects are the same as under the coverage arrangement.
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